Hi everyone! I know we are not required to post for this week, but a friend brought this YouTube video to my attention and I thought it was of particular relevance to our recent discussions about citizen knowledge levels. It is taken from an Australian television show named "The Chasers", and it includes a string of interviews with American citizens about domestic and international politics. It is not encouraging, but enjoy!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DJ3RrqBqk14
Citizen Competence in American Democracy
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Monday, October 25, 2010
Attack Ads: The Junk Food of Discourse
Today in class we touched on the idea that candidates may be losing their ability to successfully and persuasively cover issues when they are supporting the political status quo. As someone argued, it is much harder to construct a “rally around the status quo” argument than it is to construct a negative ad tearing down the status quo. So what effect does this have on campaign ads?
In my opinion, this general lack of desire to appeal to status quo supporters is resulting in a growing reliance on a more negative, attack ad hegemony. Almost every single advertisement that I have seen (for both sides) concerning the upcoming congressional election has been an attack ad. Instead of calling attention to all of the accomplishments that Perriello or Hurt have been a part of, most ads focus solely on the voting history of the opponent, and how this history is going to (in so many words) destroy Democracy and your happiness.
Is this occurring because it is easier to make an advertisement tearing down something than one building it up? One could also argue that these attack ads are just more effective in persuading voters. In speaking with fellow college students I have noticed that the general consensus about these ads is that they’re obnoxious, blatantly manipulative, and lacking substance. For this reason, most people that I know change the channel when a political attack ad comes on. But perhaps this is just because these ads aren’t intended for us to see. Instead they may be intended for less educated, less skeptical people, who may be more apt or willing to accept these exaggerated negative claims.
If these attacks are in fact just targeting certain populations, why are they the only ads that I see? I would hope that I am not in the demographic that is assumed to be persuaded by these ads, because from what I have heard, that is definitely not the case. If this is targeting specific voters, is it being done right? Or is it possible that because these ads are part of a smaller race (when compared to presidential elections) the limited resources available are being channeled into the types of advertisements that have been proven to be the most effective in the largest audience?
For whatever reason these attack ads are becoming so prominent, whether it be a lack of motivation to try and “rally around the status quo” or an attempt to target populations that respond well to these ads, I think there is a fundamental problem with seeing hundreds of ads on television and learning nothing positive and concrete about either candidate. Theorists have in the past referred to campaign ads as “political multivitamins”, informing people of the political environment in a prepackaged and entertaining form. However, I can’t see these types of ads informing people of anything legitimate and in that sense, if informational ads are multivitamins, these are surely junk food. Is there a way to produce an ad that sells the product like junk food, but affects voters like a multivitamin?
In my opinion, this general lack of desire to appeal to status quo supporters is resulting in a growing reliance on a more negative, attack ad hegemony. Almost every single advertisement that I have seen (for both sides) concerning the upcoming congressional election has been an attack ad. Instead of calling attention to all of the accomplishments that Perriello or Hurt have been a part of, most ads focus solely on the voting history of the opponent, and how this history is going to (in so many words) destroy Democracy and your happiness.
Is this occurring because it is easier to make an advertisement tearing down something than one building it up? One could also argue that these attack ads are just more effective in persuading voters. In speaking with fellow college students I have noticed that the general consensus about these ads is that they’re obnoxious, blatantly manipulative, and lacking substance. For this reason, most people that I know change the channel when a political attack ad comes on. But perhaps this is just because these ads aren’t intended for us to see. Instead they may be intended for less educated, less skeptical people, who may be more apt or willing to accept these exaggerated negative claims.
If these attacks are in fact just targeting certain populations, why are they the only ads that I see? I would hope that I am not in the demographic that is assumed to be persuaded by these ads, because from what I have heard, that is definitely not the case. If this is targeting specific voters, is it being done right? Or is it possible that because these ads are part of a smaller race (when compared to presidential elections) the limited resources available are being channeled into the types of advertisements that have been proven to be the most effective in the largest audience?
For whatever reason these attack ads are becoming so prominent, whether it be a lack of motivation to try and “rally around the status quo” or an attempt to target populations that respond well to these ads, I think there is a fundamental problem with seeing hundreds of ads on television and learning nothing positive and concrete about either candidate. Theorists have in the past referred to campaign ads as “political multivitamins”, informing people of the political environment in a prepackaged and entertaining form. However, I can’t see these types of ads informing people of anything legitimate and in that sense, if informational ads are multivitamins, these are surely junk food. Is there a way to produce an ad that sells the product like junk food, but affects voters like a multivitamin?
Electoral Politics as Campaigns for Private Interests
Electoral campaigns are not waged every two years to enlighten voters on relevant national issues and incite productive debate on such issues. They are undertaken to sway voters to elect politicians in the most cost-efficient manner. Schier has demonstrated the combination of the lowest costs and highest return has become the strategy, which happens to target segments of the population who are more likely to vote in the first place (such as Evangelical Christians, a group I didn’t realize encompassed such high participants in elections). Schier laments the rise of the campaign industry and machinery that has developed to support it. It’s highly elite and expert driven, extremely expensive and also excludes many citizens from the campaigning process altogether, another activity of citizen participation political scientists probably find valuable. In essence, this process is undemocratic or less democratic than the mobilization strategy pursued in previous eras, which aimed to spur participation across the population, rather than among these narrowly targeted groups. And not only does this type of campaigning isolate segments of voters, it also excludes many citizens from running, even gaining a shot at holding public office and making their voices heard.
One important point, Shier touched on, but did not necessarily delve into and build a strong case against, was fundraising and campaign finance, a key, if not central aspect of the electoral machinery. After all, these funds pay for the kind of expertise that targeted election strategies require. But they also represent a less-democratic quality of electoral politics and one that has repeatedly come up in the past couple months with regards to the recent midterm elections. Many Democrats, whose claims have been largely proven true by media accounts, are admonishing “secret” special interest groups who have been donating significant amounts of money to Republican campaigns without having to reveal themselves. (One op-ed column in the Washington Post today discusses it. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/24/AR2010102402216.html) Secret or not, powerful special interest groups are obviously not representative of the larger interests of the American public. Yet by paying for ads and supporting certain politicians, they get to decide “who can get in the game” and what issues are of national relevance. While the Obama administration has tried to make transparency in government, including within electoral politics, a priority, there evidently needs to be stricter rules and fewer loopholes around campaign finance.
At the end of this column today in the Washington Post, E.J. Dionne quotes:
"An election is a public good, not a private exchange," he says. "If I want to buy a car from you, that's an exchange between you and me." But elections "are not a private commodity, candidates aren't private commodities." That's right: Elections are there to be won, not bought.
I think this echoes many of the sentiments implicit in today’s readings. As public goods, elections should be free, fair and open to a broader cross-section of the voting public. Yet, as we have seen again and again in this course, making a public good readily available to the entire public while representing their interests, is quite a challenge.
One important point, Shier touched on, but did not necessarily delve into and build a strong case against, was fundraising and campaign finance, a key, if not central aspect of the electoral machinery. After all, these funds pay for the kind of expertise that targeted election strategies require. But they also represent a less-democratic quality of electoral politics and one that has repeatedly come up in the past couple months with regards to the recent midterm elections. Many Democrats, whose claims have been largely proven true by media accounts, are admonishing “secret” special interest groups who have been donating significant amounts of money to Republican campaigns without having to reveal themselves. (One op-ed column in the Washington Post today discusses it. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/24/AR2010102402216.html) Secret or not, powerful special interest groups are obviously not representative of the larger interests of the American public. Yet by paying for ads and supporting certain politicians, they get to decide “who can get in the game” and what issues are of national relevance. While the Obama administration has tried to make transparency in government, including within electoral politics, a priority, there evidently needs to be stricter rules and fewer loopholes around campaign finance.
At the end of this column today in the Washington Post, E.J. Dionne quotes:
"An election is a public good, not a private exchange," he says. "If I want to buy a car from you, that's an exchange between you and me." But elections "are not a private commodity, candidates aren't private commodities." That's right: Elections are there to be won, not bought.
I think this echoes many of the sentiments implicit in today’s readings. As public goods, elections should be free, fair and open to a broader cross-section of the voting public. Yet, as we have seen again and again in this course, making a public good readily available to the entire public while representing their interests, is quite a challenge.
Positives in Activation
I disagree with Schier’s negative views on activation over mobilization among the electorate. It is possible to see activation strategies as more inclusive rather than as “exclusive by design”. By targeting people’s specific interests, campaigns engage those who might not otherwise feel motivated to vote on the mainstream issues the media present to them. For example, the main topics discussed in news snippets might be healthcare and the environment, so a campaign could motivate a soldier to vote by directing information to him on proposed military cuts instead.
The electorate was more homogenous in the time Schier holds up as ideal for mobilization. Thus, strategies designed to cast a wide net in contemporary elections would naturally miss more people. Activation allows campaigns to specify particular groups’ interests, some of whom might otherwise get underserved. While I respect the concern that attracting as many voters as possible is no longer the ideal, I think one could see activation strategies as a possible tool to motivate more voters rather than fewer.
Engaging All Sectors
When reading the article, "Creating Constituencies," I found myself trying to locate the appeals to symbolic and material interests in the 2008 presidential campaign. Just as Bush emphasized the importance of having millions of evangelicals show up tot the election, Obama emphasized the importance of young people voting in the election. The results fromt he 2000 election campaign study found that more attention to issues of morality, thought to resonate more with evangelical conservatives, stimulated the entire population, rather than the evangelicals specifically. I wonder though if this is the same case for the 2008 election. An entire generation (younger, college aged population) is more inclusive than evangelical conservatives. Perhaps appeals to a group that is much broader will have the ability of mobilizing individuals within the group to 're-mobilize' others like them in the group as well. In the study issues of education and health care effectively mobilized women more than men, but no distinctions were made between the actions of women and women with children. This too suggests that it may be harder to target a group of individuals that is too specific for they also share many interests with non group members that make them react more towards other issues. From my perspective, it does appear that Obama had the ability to appeal to a specific age demographic, but perhaps there were group effects within this movement that attribute to the increase in participation of citizens.
The discussion about taxes and how certain appeals are likely to motivate the general public while other appeals, such as Gore's appeal to the lower and middle class voters, had the opposite affect than what was intended is quite compelling. The fact that Gore was able to stimulate the interests of citizens in the wealthier class, though granting tax cuts to the lower and middle class, highlight the idea that peole are more motivated or affected when they have to give something up versus when the material gains are most apparent. Like we discussed in class, people respond more positively when they receive a tax reimbursement check in the mail than when the monthly tax deduction from their paycheck decreases each month. The people in the wealthiest tax bracket see these tax cuts for the middle and lower income tax groups as threatening- they might lead to tax increases for the wealthy. I hesitate to believe this same 'reverse stimulation' would work if the wealthy were given tax cuts and the middle and lower income groups were unaffected. The wealthy class is already thought to be more politically active and vocal. The opportunity cost of becoming politically engaged may still be too high for the lower and middle class groups, even when tax cuts are at stake.
I think political leaders do have a responsibility to try to engage all electors. This article proves it is very hard to target a specific sector of the population by simply focusing more specifically on particular issues such as tax breaks or education. Some issues increase the awareness and political participation of all groups, thus having no effect of making the less engaged sector more vocal in the political arena. Although some efforts may not elicit the most positive response from a sector of the population, representatives must still try to engage these less engaged sectors.
The discussion about taxes and how certain appeals are likely to motivate the general public while other appeals, such as Gore's appeal to the lower and middle class voters, had the opposite affect than what was intended is quite compelling. The fact that Gore was able to stimulate the interests of citizens in the wealthier class, though granting tax cuts to the lower and middle class, highlight the idea that peole are more motivated or affected when they have to give something up versus when the material gains are most apparent. Like we discussed in class, people respond more positively when they receive a tax reimbursement check in the mail than when the monthly tax deduction from their paycheck decreases each month. The people in the wealthiest tax bracket see these tax cuts for the middle and lower income tax groups as threatening- they might lead to tax increases for the wealthy. I hesitate to believe this same 'reverse stimulation' would work if the wealthy were given tax cuts and the middle and lower income groups were unaffected. The wealthy class is already thought to be more politically active and vocal. The opportunity cost of becoming politically engaged may still be too high for the lower and middle class groups, even when tax cuts are at stake.
I think political leaders do have a responsibility to try to engage all electors. This article proves it is very hard to target a specific sector of the population by simply focusing more specifically on particular issues such as tax breaks or education. Some issues increase the awareness and political participation of all groups, thus having no effect of making the less engaged sector more vocal in the political arena. Although some efforts may not elicit the most positive response from a sector of the population, representatives must still try to engage these less engaged sectors.
Universal Mobilization w/ Material Interests Seems Reasonable
Professor Claibourn and Martin's piece argues that campaign ads and issues which focus on symbolic interests can selectively mobilize certain sectors of the population, whereas ads pertaining to material interests tend to mobilize the population across barriers of group differences. I find these results compelling and justifiable based on some of the topics we have already discussed in class. I had mentioned before in class in respect to Lodge's articles "The Responsive Voter," that maybe viewers of political campaign ads have difficulty remembering the specifiers in the advertisements because campaign ads tend to be more visionary and strategic rather than illustrate practical and materialistic goals. I assume that it is easier to grasp immediate and material benefits rather than long-term and more idealistic goals, and I find that Professor Claibourn's results may be somewhat similar - ads depicting material interests seem to engage the public at large unlike the ads that focused on symbolic interests.
Gaines' article from a few weeks ago also comes to mind in which it is argued that people can be provided with the same information but interpret the facts differently. The authors had found that with the same factual information on the number of casualties in Iraq, depending on one's partisanship, people interpreted the numbers to reinforce their opinion on whether the war should be supported or not. Similarly, when it comes to material interests highlighted in campaign ads, people interpret the facts to accommodate to their personal circumstances and interpret their own situations in the way they wish to, as well. Maybe this can also support the likeliness that material appeals spark interest in many groups of people rather than selectively mobilizing only a few.
I find it more difficult to back the results of symbolic interests with previous findings. But I assume that symbolic interests tend to be more emotion-driven, and these particular issues may simply not spark the same fears, anger, or sympathy in every group of individuals.
Gaines' article from a few weeks ago also comes to mind in which it is argued that people can be provided with the same information but interpret the facts differently. The authors had found that with the same factual information on the number of casualties in Iraq, depending on one's partisanship, people interpreted the numbers to reinforce their opinion on whether the war should be supported or not. Similarly, when it comes to material interests highlighted in campaign ads, people interpret the facts to accommodate to their personal circumstances and interpret their own situations in the way they wish to, as well. Maybe this can also support the likeliness that material appeals spark interest in many groups of people rather than selectively mobilizing only a few.
I find it more difficult to back the results of symbolic interests with previous findings. But I assume that symbolic interests tend to be more emotion-driven, and these particular issues may simply not spark the same fears, anger, or sympathy in every group of individuals.
Activation Without Diactivation?
The authors this week make a very compelling case that politicians attempt to engage particular segments of the electorate rather than the total voting body. Somewhat missing from the discussion is the idea of activating groups without diactivating others. It is likely that when one targets certain groups, other groups, especially those with conflicting interests, become diactivated -- either disengaged completely or now planning to vote against the candiate.
How is it possible to engage many, many groups (which is necessary for national elections especially) without losing too many votes from other groups in the process. President Obama is an interesting example. While I favored Obama to McCain and am therefore not as familiar with the latter's campaign, it appeared as though Obama pandered to nearly every segment of the population through various media steams. Arguably more so than anyone before him, Obama sought support from the LGBT community, yet also was very vocal about having faith-based initatives, and councils of religious leaders, etc. How is it possible to activate so many different groups, especially within such a public campaign, without drawing the attention of competing group interests?
Schier answers this question by alluding to the power of the internet to target various interests. Creating different types of ads for different types of websites would be one example. Certainly the internet lends itself to that type of tailored messaging, but because internet users are on average younger than the majority of the electorate, these customized campain ads may just fall upon deaf ears right alongside the endless ads from google and facebook.
How is it possible to engage many, many groups (which is necessary for national elections especially) without losing too many votes from other groups in the process. President Obama is an interesting example. While I favored Obama to McCain and am therefore not as familiar with the latter's campaign, it appeared as though Obama pandered to nearly every segment of the population through various media steams. Arguably more so than anyone before him, Obama sought support from the LGBT community, yet also was very vocal about having faith-based initatives, and councils of religious leaders, etc. How is it possible to activate so many different groups, especially within such a public campaign, without drawing the attention of competing group interests?
Schier answers this question by alluding to the power of the internet to target various interests. Creating different types of ads for different types of websites would be one example. Certainly the internet lends itself to that type of tailored messaging, but because internet users are on average younger than the majority of the electorate, these customized campain ads may just fall upon deaf ears right alongside the endless ads from google and facebook.
What is the Full Extent of Electorate Shaping?
All three of the articles for this week focused on the power of elites to shape the segment of the population that shows up on Election Day. Each reading, however, focused solely on the short-term effect of voting rather than on other, more longitudinal effects of campaign communications. The Mendelberg article does pay lip service to the longitudinal effects when it claims that "racial campaigns can affect far more than voters' behavior at the ballot box" (p.134), but never determines what these theoretical side-effects are or how far they can extend. Can the elite discourse during an election not only decide who gets involved today, but also serve to mold the people who will decide whether to be involved in future elections? If yes, how far into the process of shaping tomorrow's electorate to the tastes of yesterday's elites are we?
As shown by the Claibourn and Martin piece, discussions of tax policies showed broad mobilization effects. They attributed this result to two widespread misconceptions: (1) people thought they were richer, and therefore in a higher tax bracket, than they actually were; and (2) they were convinced that they would one day be rich and needed to look out for today's rich in order for there to be favorable policies in place for when they become rich themselves. The latter of these misconceptions is characteristic of a naive optimism that permeates the American public. The former, however, is based solely on a lack of knowledge of even the most basic information about a citizen's own interactions with the government. Rather than trying to correct this widespread factual error, the Bush campaign in 2000 decided to use it to its benefit to drum up support for the then-Governor and his proposed tax policy. This conduct sends one strong message from the political elites to the general public: "we don't care if you're grossly misinformed as long as you vote for us." If given repeatedly throughout many election cycles (which it almost undoubtedly is), this message could become internalized in the voting public to the point where they don't even consider it important to be informed.
In addition to the long-term dumbing down of the electorate, methods used by campaigns to shape their electorate could possibly work all too well. In areas of limited competition (which includes the vast majority of the United States, based on congressional incumbency rates), the same candidates run on the same platforms cycle after cycle. Barring significant outside influences, most of these areas end up having the same campaigns about the same issues every cycle. This continual limiting of the scope of discourse along the same lines could ostensibly instill a form of learned helplessness in the populations that are not significantly targeted by the campaigns which could be passed down from generation to generation through parents informally showing their children that the political world is not for people like them. This could, over time, create significant populations that won't become involved in political discourse, no matter how high their personal stakes may be raised. Unfortunately, this last statement sounds all too familiar.
As shown by the Claibourn and Martin piece, discussions of tax policies showed broad mobilization effects. They attributed this result to two widespread misconceptions: (1) people thought they were richer, and therefore in a higher tax bracket, than they actually were; and (2) they were convinced that they would one day be rich and needed to look out for today's rich in order for there to be favorable policies in place for when they become rich themselves. The latter of these misconceptions is characteristic of a naive optimism that permeates the American public. The former, however, is based solely on a lack of knowledge of even the most basic information about a citizen's own interactions with the government. Rather than trying to correct this widespread factual error, the Bush campaign in 2000 decided to use it to its benefit to drum up support for the then-Governor and his proposed tax policy. This conduct sends one strong message from the political elites to the general public: "we don't care if you're grossly misinformed as long as you vote for us." If given repeatedly throughout many election cycles (which it almost undoubtedly is), this message could become internalized in the voting public to the point where they don't even consider it important to be informed.
In addition to the long-term dumbing down of the electorate, methods used by campaigns to shape their electorate could possibly work all too well. In areas of limited competition (which includes the vast majority of the United States, based on congressional incumbency rates), the same candidates run on the same platforms cycle after cycle. Barring significant outside influences, most of these areas end up having the same campaigns about the same issues every cycle. This continual limiting of the scope of discourse along the same lines could ostensibly instill a form of learned helplessness in the populations that are not significantly targeted by the campaigns which could be passed down from generation to generation through parents informally showing their children that the political world is not for people like them. This could, over time, create significant populations that won't become involved in political discourse, no matter how high their personal stakes may be raised. Unfortunately, this last statement sounds all too familiar.
Race and Election Issues: Displaced Agency
I was particularly intrigued this week by the Mendelberg article “Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign”. I understood his general correlation, in that often time racially sensitive issues may influence racial conservatism during elections. In the Horton case study, a young black convicted criminal attacks a middle-class wife and husband during a weekend furlough (a liberal program at the time). Mendelberg shows through a case study conducted among University of Michigan students that, statistically, election issues involving race tend to create deeper racial conservative sentiments among prejudiced-voters. I agree with Mendelberg’s research, however, I think he perhaps mistakes the agency of the issue.
Mendelberg is a little quick to jump the gun on pinpointing race as an election “game-changer”. Firstly, Mendelberg’s research hardly captured a diverse and unbiased response. Assuming the data was collected within a few years of the article’s publication (1997), the response group consisted of impressionable college students during considerable welfare reform under the Clinton administration. Mendelberg also admits that although his research shows a correlation of increased racial conservatism, there may likely still be multiple alternate explanations. Although, Mendelberg is able to establish a positive correlation, I do not think he answers the most important questions regarding the issue. These questions are: Is there a substantial intentional use racist tactics in election campaigns? ( I personally gathered that the relation of racial appeals in the Hortons case was more incidental) What is the process of eliminating racist sentiments from election campaigns?
Do racial appeals by candidates occur more often today? I felt that Mendelberg’s article illuminated an issue, but in a way, it also instigated the issue further. The article acknowledges that Bush was making a statement against liberal programs and enabled crime, NOT an issue directly concerned with racial welfare. The racial stereotypes and prejudice had to be finessed out of the campaign. I believe that Mendelberg attempts to put the agency on the politicians, instead of the voters. The problem should lie in the competency and education of the voters and how they perceive campaign issues. Is the agency displaced in this article? Voters should be able to recognize election issues appropriately; it is not the candidates role to tip-toe around issue because of the possible uneducated perception of prejudiced individuals.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
It's Race Not Crime!
In the article Executing Hortons Racial Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign by Tali Mendelberg, suggests that during the 1988 electoral campaign the race card was utilized to shift the views of citizens regarding equality using such ads as the famous case of Willie Horton, a black man who entered the house of a white couple where he committed murder and rape. This ad clearly shows Horton as a threat to society especially because of his race. This ad is terrifying and it was created to attract people to vote against "crimes" like these. Menderlberg claims that even today the race card will always be used and implied during elections to influence people's decisions and attract votes in their favor as long as they don't get caught.
It is rather hard to ultimately stop the use of the card race but compared to the 1988 elections, today it doesn't seem as obvious as it did back then. This is not to say that "we expect race to fade away from electoral politics anytime soon now that it has worked itself into the fabric of the party system" but that it will continue to exist throughout time. Mendelberg seems to regard race as something necessary for electoral campaigns "to rely on racial appeals for political advantage, and they do so because of the structural imperatives of American politics". Mendelberg seems to lose hope and seems to regard the electoral campaigns as a game using strategies such as race to attract votes.
Overall, race will continue play a part in electoral campaigns and in American politics. Racism will never disappear. It is hard to completely dissolve racism in politics but it is something that will continue to exist in elections.
Selective Mass Mobilization
Professor Claibourne’s look at target groups through material and symbolic interests suggested that mass mobilization/ “Get Out and Vote” campaigns are fairly inefficient at engaging groups from the view of the candidate. My question refers to mass mobilization campaigns across distinct sectors instead of selective mobilization. I spent a summer in the Hill and as a fun send-off I went to T.I.’s “Respect My Vote” campaign in DC. The campaign was independent of any party, deriving its name from the popular song, “Respect My Hustle”. Although there was a subtle penchant for Obama, the campaign was founded on principles of widespread political engagement among young voters. Without any research done on this movement, I would propose that either material or symbolic value placed on celebrity/pop culture resonated among young voters, especially young African American voters, and increased the voting percentage X% across this sector.
Given the current campaign finance laws governing elections, could it be advantageous for candidates to selectively mass mobilize?
Mendelberg’s work on the 1988 election studies consequences of racial priming among white voters on public opinion: resistance to government programs and attitudes, as well as keen awareness of racial conflict. A look at the variable coefficients in his experimental model would suggest that the 1988 was marked by racial priming that led to a dynamic shift in policy/public attitude. The last sentence of the piece reads “As long as racial appeals continues, electoral campaigns will be lost opportunities for bridging the nation’s racial chasm.” Does an appeal have to exhibit negative connotations or priming effects? Does the 2008 election 20 years later shed light?
Given the current campaign finance laws governing elections, could it be advantageous for candidates to selectively mass mobilize?
Mendelberg’s work on the 1988 election studies consequences of racial priming among white voters on public opinion: resistance to government programs and attitudes, as well as keen awareness of racial conflict. A look at the variable coefficients in his experimental model would suggest that the 1988 was marked by racial priming that led to a dynamic shift in policy/public attitude. The last sentence of the piece reads “As long as racial appeals continues, electoral campaigns will be lost opportunities for bridging the nation’s racial chasm.” Does an appeal have to exhibit negative connotations or priming effects? Does the 2008 election 20 years later shed light?
Racial Appeals in Elections
Mendelberg makes the claim that electoral campaigns even in this day and age will use racial appeals if they can get away with it. These racial appeals, however, will never be explicit, they will be implicit and can only have their desired effect if the viewer does not realize the message has a racial connotation. Mendelberg gives the famous example of the Willie Horton ad, which was used in the 1988 Bush v. Dukakis presidential election. The ad never made any explicit claim to race, but viewers who had racial predispositions against African-Americans were being primed. Mendelberg ends by saying that as long as these racial appeals continue, electoral campaigns will not be able to "bridge the nation's racial chasm."
Is it possible to completely stop racial appeals? Maybe, but it would be difficult and as long as people stand to gain from them, they will be used. A better question would be, how can we mitigate the effectiveness of racial appeals? I think the response to the Willie Horton ad shows how it can be done. Jesse Jackson was late with his claim that the ad had racist elements and Dukakis never made an effort to recognize the racial appeal in the ad. Had Dukakis spoken about the ad and had Jesse Jackson criticized it earlier, the media would have had more time to analyze the ad and condemn it. When people realize the ad is racist they start to reject the appeal.
A more recent example would be George Allen's gaffe in calling an Indian-American staff member of his opponent, Jim Webb, a "macaca." In the video clip which can be viewed on YouTube, he doesn't seem to be explicitly bringing race into his message, he even says: "macaca, or whatever his name is." He even welcomes "macaca" to America, despite the fact he was born in Virginia and even attended our very own UVA. After people found out what "macaca" meant and its use by colonialists in Africa, it severely hurt Allen's reputation and he eventually lost.
It seems to me the best way to combat racial appeals is by making them explicit. By discussing any implicit racial ads or speeches, the racial message is brought to the forefront and can no longer prime people's racial bias. If we cannot get rid of racial appeals altogether, this may be a good second best.
Is it possible to completely stop racial appeals? Maybe, but it would be difficult and as long as people stand to gain from them, they will be used. A better question would be, how can we mitigate the effectiveness of racial appeals? I think the response to the Willie Horton ad shows how it can be done. Jesse Jackson was late with his claim that the ad had racist elements and Dukakis never made an effort to recognize the racial appeal in the ad. Had Dukakis spoken about the ad and had Jesse Jackson criticized it earlier, the media would have had more time to analyze the ad and condemn it. When people realize the ad is racist they start to reject the appeal.
A more recent example would be George Allen's gaffe in calling an Indian-American staff member of his opponent, Jim Webb, a "macaca." In the video clip which can be viewed on YouTube, he doesn't seem to be explicitly bringing race into his message, he even says: "macaca, or whatever his name is." He even welcomes "macaca" to America, despite the fact he was born in Virginia and even attended our very own UVA. After people found out what "macaca" meant and its use by colonialists in Africa, it severely hurt Allen's reputation and he eventually lost.
It seems to me the best way to combat racial appeals is by making them explicit. By discussing any implicit racial ads or speeches, the racial message is brought to the forefront and can no longer prime people's racial bias. If we cannot get rid of racial appeals altogether, this may be a good second best.
Race in American Politics
Tali Mendelberg's piece on "Racial Craime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign" was very interesting due to its focus on the Willie Horton story. I was first exposed to the Horton ad in another politics class at the University, though we did not discuss the racial implications of the ad itself. Mendelberg, on the other hand, believes that, "Given the right conditions, a racial campaign can reinforce a variety of racially conservative views and actions" (134). The ad was broadcast over 20 years ago, in a much different environment than the one in which we live today in a number of ways - especially with regards to race. Today, the Horton ad would have been considered a sort of abomination, setting off a chain of events that would culminate in some sort of protest against racial campaigning. The ad itself is terrifying, featuring a grainy picture of Horton with the words "Kidnapping", "Stabbing", and "Raping" underneath. It is clearly intended to have a sobering effect on the audience, especially given the tone of the man in the advertisement. Would the ad have been equally as terrifying if it had featured a white man? I sincerely doubt it, given the stereotypes attached to African American criminals, prisoners, etc. A television show on the History Channel known as "Gangland" features documentaries on the most horrifying gangs in America - the majority of which are African American. For some reason, the white gangs do not seem to combat as much fear from the audience. An additional experiment for Mendelberg to conduct would have featured a white man's picture in the place of Horton's to see if the ad really was constructed to appeal to issues of crime rather than race. Yet, is that to say that every time a non-white man's picture is used in an ad it has racial undertones? We are simultaneously trying to downplay the race card while attempting to equalize racial attitudes. However, it is impossible to put everyone on equal footing without including minorities in political campaigns, etc. Though on the other hand, it is impossible to downplay the race card simultaneously because not including minorities from campaigns would ignite that same prejudice we are attempting to dissipate.
The concern over the Horton ad stems from not only his ethnicity, but also the nature of the crimes he committed. It seems as though voters were more likely to use Horton's specific situation as indicative of African American prisoners to some extent. Therefore, by increasing racial prejudice, voters perceptions of the election changed. It is impossible to tell how perceptions would have differed if the ad had featured a white man - but how important is it that Horton was black? He was clearly guilty of the crimes he committed, which unfairly ads to racial prejudice. Yet, at the same time, was there a white man who had committed similar heinous crimes at the time as a result of the weekend pass? If there was, then the ad absolutely cannot deny its racial implications. However, since there was probably not another prisoner who had committed such horrific crimes, white or black, it is reasonable to understand the use of Horton in the ad for the purpose of appealing to voters. The fact that it may or may not have impacted political opinion is clearly a cause for concern because, whether it intended to or not, racial prejudice has no place in politics. As discussed in the Claibourn and Martin article, the ad unfairly discourages certain groups from the political process. In the case of the Horton ad, that group was minorities, and specifically African Americans. By discouraging certain groups and altering perceptions of racial prejudice within the context of an election, the political process becomes nothing more than an elite-driven machine. Everyone who is not represented or protected by the elites is cast out of the political process unjustly, leading to further discontent and subsequently more stereotyping at the hand of the advantaged. The Horton story is a prime example of racial prejudice - one that may have had a large effect on the outcome of the race between Bush and Dukakis, for better or for worse.
Saturday, October 23, 2010
Periello is anti-children and Hurt is anti-elderly people
In his book, By Invitation Only, Schier argues that parties, interest groups, and candidates encourage particular, finely targeted segments of the population to become active in elections, demonstrations, and lobbying. Schier seems this "by invitation only" strategy of these groups as a tragedy of the commons. It would be in the publics best interest if all citizens were mobilized to vote. However, limited resources (time and money) and the ultimate goal of winning (as opposed to increasing democratic participation) incentivizes candidates to only focus on those people who can get them elected. Schier states that campaigns are most likely to target moderate-knowledge voters who are undecided.
I have seen examples of this selective activation in the recent campaign for Virginia's fifth district between Robert Hurt and Tom Perriello. Perriello is running a TV ad in which senior citizens discuss how Hurt would take away health care benefits from the elderly if he were elected. Hurt had a TV ad which features children with heavy backpacks implying that Periello is weighing down the youth of Virginia with... something to do with taxes (As Schier points out in his book, people pay more attention to the visuals in ads as opposed to the actual messages. Therefore I'm going to forgive myself for not remembering the specific message). This is a prime example of selective activation. These two ads are targeted at two different groups, the elderly and mothers (who don't want to see their children lugging around the burden that would befall them if Periello were reelected).
These two candidates are definitely not reaching out to me and other college students because of our history of low voter turn out. Instead they are reaching out to those people who are potentially undecided but who are likely to vote.
Friday, October 22, 2010
Government for the people, by some of the people
In contrasting "mobilization" with its modern counterpart "activation," Schier writes that the former provided a clear decision on their preferred party on the part of the citizenry, where the latter does not (9). While I do agree that the two terms have many differences, I disagree that this is one of them. Simply because one party was able to mobilize more voters does not mean that they participated more genuinely in politics than participants do today. As we have read, these party "mobilizers" would bribe citizens, hand out pre-checked ballots, etc., that made voting a largely irrational decision. These partisan elections did not see results that were more representative of Americans' true views more than those today.
Schier goes on to say that a decline in representative mobilization allows policy-makers to supplant consideration of majority views with the views of the targeted groups that elected them. I think, either way, the political power is in the hands of the politicians--whether these are the candidates themselves or the partisan "mobilizers"--because they choose how they want to mobilize the citizenry. In the partisan era, presumably voters weren't voting because they were taking into account the good of the country. Rather, they were provided with incentives or were incited by partisan ringleaders. This is essentially the same way it works today, but the groups are narrower, and the tangible incentives (15) have been replaced with behind-the-scenes ones. In both eras, it is doubtful that candidates feared the majority in their constituency, but rather, they feared the opposing candidate or party who would be able to rally that constituency. Even Claibourn and Martin point out that campaign advertising with a clear target risks identifying a "clear opponent" (9) as well, but that that opponent is usually appealed to by the opposing party/candidate itself--it is this possible appeal that proves threatening to politicians. The public at large, in its default passivity, was and still is not a looming threat without the appeal of external political forces.
Despite these minor flaws in his initial argument, Schier does well to describe the consequences of increased activation in modern politics, particularly in light of modern technology. His assertion that activation is here to stay (123) should worry those of us concerned with participatory democracy. If selective targeting allows only certain groups to feel they have "voice" (Claibourn and Martin, 10), and therefore a sense of political agency, government "by the people" adopts a too-narrow scope.
Schier goes on to say that a decline in representative mobilization allows policy-makers to supplant consideration of majority views with the views of the targeted groups that elected them. I think, either way, the political power is in the hands of the politicians--whether these are the candidates themselves or the partisan "mobilizers"--because they choose how they want to mobilize the citizenry. In the partisan era, presumably voters weren't voting because they were taking into account the good of the country. Rather, they were provided with incentives or were incited by partisan ringleaders. This is essentially the same way it works today, but the groups are narrower, and the tangible incentives (15) have been replaced with behind-the-scenes ones. In both eras, it is doubtful that candidates feared the majority in their constituency, but rather, they feared the opposing candidate or party who would be able to rally that constituency. Even Claibourn and Martin point out that campaign advertising with a clear target risks identifying a "clear opponent" (9) as well, but that that opponent is usually appealed to by the opposing party/candidate itself--it is this possible appeal that proves threatening to politicians. The public at large, in its default passivity, was and still is not a looming threat without the appeal of external political forces.
Despite these minor flaws in his initial argument, Schier does well to describe the consequences of increased activation in modern politics, particularly in light of modern technology. His assertion that activation is here to stay (123) should worry those of us concerned with participatory democracy. If selective targeting allows only certain groups to feel they have "voice" (Claibourn and Martin, 10), and therefore a sense of political agency, government "by the people" adopts a too-narrow scope.
Monday, October 18, 2010
Social Constructs and the Financial Crisis
I really enjoyed the Schneider and Ingram article on social construction and think that it is a fairly accurate depiction. A good example of how this construction works in real life can be seen during the financial crisis. A powerful (in the sense of wealthy) but somewhat negatively viewed group, Wall Street, is in trouble. It is an important target population since it can contribute significantly to political campaigns and all politicians need money. Both President Bush and Obama help to bail them out but they have to link this bailout to a more general public policy. They say that if Wall Street was not bailed out, then the entire economy could have collapsed. They link their actions to a common good since Wall Street’s benefits were oversubscribed and the money could have possibly been spent in other sectors to help the economy. Politicians also make the point that the government will be paid back so the benefits seem less clear to the public since companies are only getting temporary help. Thus the “benefits [are] noticed only be members of the target groups and [are] largely hidden from everyone else” (p338). Still, I think that it is pretty clear that this policy is not entirely fair and many Americans feel that the average Joe was screwed over.
One way to change this policy is to punish politicians who supported the negatively construed groups. This desire to hold politicians accountable seems to be some part of the motivation of groups like the Tea Party who hate the idea of TARP and all the bailouts. They are very much against politicians who supported these measures and there are a lot of politicians in trouble. The authors do warn that “policy directed solely to the benefit of powerful groups could become a major campaign liability” (p344) and this seems to be very accurate in the 2010 elections. We’ve seen incumbent Republicans lose in primaries to Tea Party candidates and there will likely be Democrats who lose in the general election. There is more generally an anti-incumbent mood in the American population. I do think a lot of it has to do with the fact that “total Wall Street compensation is on pace to reach $144 billion for 2010, a record for the second consecutive year” (according to the Wall Street Journal) while around 10% of the American population is unemployed. The people responsible for the crash seem to be receiving the most benefits. Thus a negatively viewed group is receiving too many overt benefits and so there is backlash. This acts as a balancing mechanism where “dramatic events will often serve as catalysts for changes in social constructions” so that groups may become more negatively or positively viewed. I would say that now Wall Street is viewed more negatively like Goldman Sachs which was called a “great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money” by Rolling Stone. This in turn makes it harder for politicians to give benefits to Wall Street, even if they don’t have electoral pressure. Thus, the bailouts seems to confirm Schneider and Ingram’s claims about how social construction works.
School Surveillance and Citizenship
Hirschfield suggests that the practice of surveillance in schools varies based on political context. Large urban school districts are more likely to experience a top-down implementation of surveillance policies that originate from a mayor, as in the New York and Chicago examples. The difference between exclusionary and inclusionary practices may rest on the reputation of the administrator and how he or she wants to be portrayed (47). This concerns me because it means that in some situations, the physical and psychological well-being of the students is not actually a priority.
The article also seems to indicate that treatment in school trains students for their roles in society as adults. Students subjected to aggressive surveillance learn that the state exists to monitor and subordinate them, while those with inclusive schools learn that the state is there to protect their interests. More arrests are made in schools with exclusionary models, and academic time is de-prioritized. These practices indoctrinate students on how to behave as citizens. Unfortunately, Hirschfield says that they reproduce racial and economic inequalities.
Most of the studies we've read this semester support the idea that education matters significantly in citizen competence. This article brings to our attention how school environment teaches people a way of life regardless of what they are learning in the classroom. Additionally, educational resources often suffer when money is spent on elaborate security measures instead. Students could benefit from further research on the effectiveness of surveillance and from insulation from the political agendas of local officials and administrators.
Encouraging Participation of All Groups
I think it is common knowledge that there are certain groups of people who are less likely to vote and participate in other political activities. Before reading the Soss article, I assumed these groups were divided based on race, economic status, education...etc. I gave little thought to the extent that policy structures unique to each group influence and shape the way they view government. As Soss explains, it may not be that welfare overall decreases a groups participation but rather the structure of certain welfare programs send negative cues to people about how the overall government agencies operate. Soss shows how recipients of AFDC are less likely to go to the polls that other individuals. This may largely be due to the nature in which these recipients are treated through the process of getting welfare aide. For example, recipients of AFDC must frequently prove that they are eligible for assistance and constantly fear their aide will be terminated. These people are at the mercy of the caseworkers and fear speaking up or defending their stituation. These fears influence their opinion of government overall causing AFDC participants to refrain from becoming active members in the political system.
I have to wonder if these insitutions are built in such a way to specifically discourage participation from a certain class of individuals. Many Americans have a negative view of welfare recipients and believe they are draining the wealth of other Americans. As Schneider talked about, there groups within the population which posses different levels of influence over policy, due to their power and positive or negative reputations within a society. The advantaged group is the group that has power and a positive reputation within society. AFDC recipients could fall in the group which is powerful (due to the number of individuals) but negatively viewed by society. Schnieider calls this group the contenders. Often, policy makers will impose a cost on the contenders that sends the message to other groups (mainly the advantaged group who the policiy makers are most responsive towards) that policy makers are interested in punishing this group for their abuse of power and their sefishness (receiving welfare). It seems logical that the construction of institutions like AFDC are meant to send the message to all groups that the government is going to make these contenders (welfare recipeints) work for their handouts. Therefore, while policy makers might be hesitant to make the availability of welfare handouts more accesible, because they may upset advantaged groups with the message that these actions send, these steps would no doubt improve the political participation of many Americans. If the contenders develop a more positive view of welfare agencies such as the AFDC, they will likely view the government overall as being interested in their well being.
I have to wonder if these insitutions are built in such a way to specifically discourage participation from a certain class of individuals. Many Americans have a negative view of welfare recipients and believe they are draining the wealth of other Americans. As Schneider talked about, there groups within the population which posses different levels of influence over policy, due to their power and positive or negative reputations within a society. The advantaged group is the group that has power and a positive reputation within society. AFDC recipients could fall in the group which is powerful (due to the number of individuals) but negatively viewed by society. Schnieider calls this group the contenders. Often, policy makers will impose a cost on the contenders that sends the message to other groups (mainly the advantaged group who the policiy makers are most responsive towards) that policy makers are interested in punishing this group for their abuse of power and their sefishness (receiving welfare). It seems logical that the construction of institutions like AFDC are meant to send the message to all groups that the government is going to make these contenders (welfare recipeints) work for their handouts. Therefore, while policy makers might be hesitant to make the availability of welfare handouts more accesible, because they may upset advantaged groups with the message that these actions send, these steps would no doubt improve the political participation of many Americans. If the contenders develop a more positive view of welfare agencies such as the AFDC, they will likely view the government overall as being interested in their well being.
It's why we have masters degrees in this stuff
“Policy creates politics” quoted Schneider and Ingram in their article and each of the authors we read for today supported this statement in one way or another. They also touched on the fact that at a basic level, public policy is the day-to-day politics that most citizens will come closest into contact with. If effective (or conversely, ineffective,) public policy impacts the lives and behavior of citizens and subsequently, as Soss contends, their perceptions of government competence as a whole. None of the readings seemed particularly or insightful, but rather re-emphasized and deconstructed truths about policy that seem self-evident in the first place, that is: good policy is essential to democracy and, is incredibly complex and difficult.
Schneider and Ingram touch on one of the main challenges of creating and executing good policy that I would think must be an absolutely basic premise and lesson in policy education. Policy makers must utilize a limited amount of knowledge to affect a large and varied group of people. Target populations share qualities that are reason for being the target of a policy, but within such populations, citizens might encompass a wide range of experience and behavior and therefore, react differently to a policy initiative. Thus, the primary assumptions policy-makers are forced to make are both essential and far-reaching and when these assumptions are based on misrepresentative social constructions, such policy can be ill-informed and ultimately, disadvantageous to certain groups. Look no farther than welfare policy and its surrounding debate. But this sounds like Public Policy 101: know your target population. This knowledge must be grounded in an in-depth and multi-faceted understanding of the needs and behaviors of a given group, not in a surface-level social construction. A balance, however, must be struck between utilizing some stereotypes in order to make the necessary assumptions, while constructively parsing out others.
The policy examples that follow in the other readings sustain one of the premises in Schneider and Ingram’s contentions: that policies are designed based on the needs and characterizations of target participants and recipients. Welfare, the GI Bill and even school security represent a wide range of policy, with very different aims and aimed at very different target groups. From economic to education, from participatory to punitive, policy creation and outcome, while altogether affecting the behaviors of their recipients/participants and those people’s perceptions of citizenship and government, take many forms. With so many variables at play here, it’s illogical to draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of policy in general. (Although social construction clearly plays a role in their design.) To me, what ultimately comes across is that policy creation requires substantial research and expertise because its consequences are far-reaching for democracy.
Schneider and Ingram touch on one of the main challenges of creating and executing good policy that I would think must be an absolutely basic premise and lesson in policy education. Policy makers must utilize a limited amount of knowledge to affect a large and varied group of people. Target populations share qualities that are reason for being the target of a policy, but within such populations, citizens might encompass a wide range of experience and behavior and therefore, react differently to a policy initiative. Thus, the primary assumptions policy-makers are forced to make are both essential and far-reaching and when these assumptions are based on misrepresentative social constructions, such policy can be ill-informed and ultimately, disadvantageous to certain groups. Look no farther than welfare policy and its surrounding debate. But this sounds like Public Policy 101: know your target population. This knowledge must be grounded in an in-depth and multi-faceted understanding of the needs and behaviors of a given group, not in a surface-level social construction. A balance, however, must be struck between utilizing some stereotypes in order to make the necessary assumptions, while constructively parsing out others.
The policy examples that follow in the other readings sustain one of the premises in Schneider and Ingram’s contentions: that policies are designed based on the needs and characterizations of target participants and recipients. Welfare, the GI Bill and even school security represent a wide range of policy, with very different aims and aimed at very different target groups. From economic to education, from participatory to punitive, policy creation and outcome, while altogether affecting the behaviors of their recipients/participants and those people’s perceptions of citizenship and government, take many forms. With so many variables at play here, it’s illogical to draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of policy in general. (Although social construction clearly plays a role in their design.) To me, what ultimately comes across is that policy creation requires substantial research and expertise because its consequences are far-reaching for democracy.
Positive Step Towards Participation
I feel that this week's articles actually bring possible solutions to the table in terms of populations that have low levels of political participation. In the Schneider and Ingram piece, it seems as if certain groups of people are damned to whatever social construction is placed upon them by public officials. But the Soss and Mettler pieces propose that a change in the way policy/social programs are implemented and constructed can bring about positive outcomes.
Soss illustrates how clients receiving benefits from the AFDC are much more hesitant to express their concern or disapproval of the agency and how they are treated compared to members of SSDI or even parents involved in the Head Start program. At first, I believed these differences were due to the maintenance of eligibility requirements that AFDC clients are routinely mandated to complete in order to receive aid. However, in light of the Mettler article and how veterans are also required to routinely prove their eligibility and their satisfaction with the GI Bill, I thought differently. Benefits for the GI Bill were administered smoothly and possibly more easily than for the AFDC clients. Also, the parents of Head Start were required to participate in local meetings that allowed them to get involve in the decision-making and policy-making processes. This provided Head Start members with some form of political efficacy which the AFDC members did not have. If social programs can implement their policy and distribute benefits in a more hassle-free method and can also provide ways in which members are informed about the rules of the programs and given opportunities to speak up, then maybe those groups of people placed into the more negative and weak social constructions will be more compelled to participate. Soss makes a point that if policy-making was more responsive rather than directive, then maybe more people will be driven to participate.
Someone had suggested blogs where people can express their concerns and opinions. I think this is great method and can be supplemented by local meet-ups where clients can voice their needs and preferences. This is definitely not a solution that has been well thought out or intricately planned, but it seems that the articles display the differences between certain social programs, and if we could just adopt some of the characteristics of those programs where clients are satisfied, then maybe it can help us get closer to a more participatory public.
Soss illustrates how clients receiving benefits from the AFDC are much more hesitant to express their concern or disapproval of the agency and how they are treated compared to members of SSDI or even parents involved in the Head Start program. At first, I believed these differences were due to the maintenance of eligibility requirements that AFDC clients are routinely mandated to complete in order to receive aid. However, in light of the Mettler article and how veterans are also required to routinely prove their eligibility and their satisfaction with the GI Bill, I thought differently. Benefits for the GI Bill were administered smoothly and possibly more easily than for the AFDC clients. Also, the parents of Head Start were required to participate in local meetings that allowed them to get involve in the decision-making and policy-making processes. This provided Head Start members with some form of political efficacy which the AFDC members did not have. If social programs can implement their policy and distribute benefits in a more hassle-free method and can also provide ways in which members are informed about the rules of the programs and given opportunities to speak up, then maybe those groups of people placed into the more negative and weak social constructions will be more compelled to participate. Soss makes a point that if policy-making was more responsive rather than directive, then maybe more people will be driven to participate.
Someone had suggested blogs where people can express their concerns and opinions. I think this is great method and can be supplemented by local meet-ups where clients can voice their needs and preferences. This is definitely not a solution that has been well thought out or intricately planned, but it seems that the articles display the differences between certain social programs, and if we could just adopt some of the characteristics of those programs where clients are satisfied, then maybe it can help us get closer to a more participatory public.
Welfare and Participation: Correlation or Causation?
The Soss article suggests that different government policies may affect how people view government, in turn affecting levels of civic participation . Soss argues that although welfare was created with the positive intentions of providing temporary assistance to those in need, it may have negative affect of decreasing levels of participation and engagement in politics. Programs such as AFDC make citizens feel marginalized. Some of the ideas in the article are very convincing, including the idea that policies leading to broader political issues and a heightened sense of political efficacy.
But isn’t this assuming a correlation between those on welfare and civic particpation to be a causal relationship? Welfare may provide people with “direct exposure to government institutions” (376) But this does not mean their views about the government were shaped by this exposure. Even if their ideas were shaped by the programs, would there level of civic participation have been different if they were not on welfare? It's hard to say. So why would we assume that removal of or a change in these policies would lead to increased participation? The fact that you need to be welfare may say something about you that indicates a predisposal to decreased civil participation.
The article states that AFDC participants are less likely to vote than SSDI participants. The data controls for age, race, income, etc. But what about the number of children they have and age of those children? The fact that someone needs AFDC suggests that they have more children than they are able to support. Aren’t children (specifically preschool children) one of the biggest time drainers? So is the difference in particpation really because of the type of policy? Or is it because AFDC participants are too busy trying to figure out how to take care of their children making minimum wage salary to bother with “political participation” ?
I think it would have been more effective to look at the level of civic participation of one person right before and right after they applied for AFDC. If Soss is correct, the person would become less politically active and less likely to vote after becoming an AFDC participant.
But isn’t this assuming a correlation between those on welfare and civic particpation to be a causal relationship? Welfare may provide people with “direct exposure to government institutions” (376) But this does not mean their views about the government were shaped by this exposure. Even if their ideas were shaped by the programs, would there level of civic participation have been different if they were not on welfare? It's hard to say. So why would we assume that removal of or a change in these policies would lead to increased participation? The fact that you need to be welfare may say something about you that indicates a predisposal to decreased civil participation.
The article states that AFDC participants are less likely to vote than SSDI participants. The data controls for age, race, income, etc. But what about the number of children they have and age of those children? The fact that someone needs AFDC suggests that they have more children than they are able to support. Aren’t children (specifically preschool children) one of the biggest time drainers? So is the difference in particpation really because of the type of policy? Or is it because AFDC participants are too busy trying to figure out how to take care of their children making minimum wage salary to bother with “political participation” ?
I think it would have been more effective to look at the level of civic participation of one person right before and right after they applied for AFDC. If Soss is correct, the person would become less politically active and less likely to vote after becoming an AFDC participant.
Social Constructions? So what?
I feel that Schnieder and Ingram felt as though they were getting at a truly novel idea that I think was not present. The notions that some groups are stigmatized and that that affects both their level of participation and the perception of how policy affecting them is viewed by the masses are not as revolutionary as one would get the sense of by reading the piece. I am particularly not convinced by the claim early in the piece that "[t]he theory is important because it helps explain why some groups are advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of political power". To me, Figure 1 screams "traditional notions of political power". When I first read this I expected to later read about sometimes minorities not being as disadvantaged as one would expect, or that sometimes rich, white, men don't have it so easy. This was not the case. How does their theory about social constructions of target groups account for political advantage/disadvantage any different than popular images and ideas of target groups?
I agreed with the authors that there are objective realites to target groups (falling below x amount of income, driving a car, being a certain race/religion/sexual orientation, etc.) but I failed to understand whose construction of these groups was the most relevant. While it is true that there are objective relaties to the target groups, the authors failed to show that there is an overarching and popularly held constrution of group A; rather, the authors admitted that "Social constructions are often conflicting and subject to contention. Policy directed at persons whose income falls below the official poverty level identifies a specific set of persons. The social constructions could portray them as disadvantaged people whose poverty is not their fault or as lazy persons who are benefitting from other peoples' hard work."
If there is no agreed upon construction for a certain group, how can we talk about the implications of it if they are so fluid? If we lower our standards and agree that perhaps group A has a concrete construction of group B, what can be said of that, if anything?
Bottom line: the ideas presented in the piece were just common sense, intuitive ideas that were grounded in little to no empirical work. Yes, the idea that depending on how a group is viewed affects A, B, and C... but viewed by whom?
I agreed with the authors that there are objective realites to target groups (falling below x amount of income, driving a car, being a certain race/religion/sexual orientation, etc.) but I failed to understand whose construction of these groups was the most relevant. While it is true that there are objective relaties to the target groups, the authors failed to show that there is an overarching and popularly held constrution of group A; rather, the authors admitted that "Social constructions are often conflicting and subject to contention. Policy directed at persons whose income falls below the official poverty level identifies a specific set of persons. The social constructions could portray them as disadvantaged people whose poverty is not their fault or as lazy persons who are benefitting from other peoples' hard work."
If there is no agreed upon construction for a certain group, how can we talk about the implications of it if they are so fluid? If we lower our standards and agree that perhaps group A has a concrete construction of group B, what can be said of that, if anything?
Bottom line: the ideas presented in the piece were just common sense, intuitive ideas that were grounded in little to no empirical work. Yes, the idea that depending on how a group is viewed affects A, B, and C... but viewed by whom?
Policy, Groups, and Interest Convergence
I felt that Schneider and Ingram held a strong point with their group theory, in the article “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy”. It is often those strong, positive group powers that hold the largest advantage as policy movers. Groups such as the elderly, or rich, white businessman are often times the beneficiaries of policy, while requiring little individual effort. On the other side, groups seen in a negative light, such as criminals or drug abusers face a long uphill battle in establishing favorable policy. Schneider and Ingram write that it is hardest for these groups to influence policy, and any change requires the largest relative burden of responsibility. Due to the increased burden, what is the role of interest convergence in establishing minority policies?
The concept of “interest convergence” is often applied to minority rights, but can also be attributed to other minority opinions/groups. It essentially refers to the theory that minority groups will receive policy recognition only when it converges with the interests of the majority. For example, the Brown v. Board of Education decision to desegregate schools is also seen as a lateral foreign policy move. The United States was in the middle of the Cold War and used desegregation as a way of combating communist propaganda. How does interest convergence hurt minority groups? In my opinion, interest convergence is at a least a way of entering the political game. If it does require a minority group entering the policy world through a big player, than at least there is some initial impact of policy influence. As deviants are drug abusers or criminals (or even those with AIDs, who are similarly frowned upon) able to create any relationship with those belonging in the “strong, positive” square?
I think that the most effective way for those groups with negative constructions and/or weak power is to create alliances with other more favorably viewed groups. Alliances can create power political partnerships. Often times these alliances can be created through “interest convergence”. For example, in the early 90’s, middle-class black businessman in Atlanta were able to align themselves with white developers and create a relatively affluent black population in the downtown area. Blacks at the time would probably have fit in the weak, and less favorable block of groups. I think that it is currently necessary for groups that find themselves outside the focus of policymakers, to make adjustments and latch on to policy influence through other groups.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
For good or for ill
The essay of Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to citizens, was really interesting because it leads us to take a step back regarding the success of the GI Bill.
On the one hand, I agree with the fact that the help of the state for veterans with the GI Bill influenced the citizens towards a more active form of participatory citizenship. Suzanne Mettler says that one of the main reasons why the GI bill increased the participation of veterans in democracy is because the program dealt with the education that clearly leads to more civic competence skills.
On the other hand, I don't think that we can generalize the benefits of the GI Bill to all social programs initiated by the government. It is interesting to compare the situation of US and France, a country where the government is involved in several social programs, providing free health care, free education -both school and college- financial help for families and unemployment benefits. The French don't participate in democracy more than the Americans do, and I don't think that they feel more involved in the society than in the U.S.
Nevertheless, I also hardly agree with the point made by the author about the fact that the government programs influence the participation of citizens for ill or for good. One of the reasons why the GI Bill lead to more involvement is because it was seen as really positive as it was fair and efficient. In France, the intervention of the government influences for ill the citizens, because most of the time they only participate with huge strikes every time they are not satisfied by the government.
As a conclusion, I think that the GI Bill's success in a more active form of citizen participation was exceptional, and that it was due to the context of the postwar period. For me, we can't generalize this success to all the programs of the government.
Influencial Policy and Competence
It has been well-established basis in conventional democratic theory that citizens are the driving force in affecting policy. But if policy is thought of as a simple government product, or output, it is reasonable to fathom potential influences on participation and competence. The first Ingram reading impressed me by providing justification for empirical data. I made an unfounded premature claim about just casually changing cultural norms in the last class. This week’s readings shed more light to this issue.
Ingram’s discussion of social constructions/stereotypes and the sebsequent value we place on them presented a fresh look on the importance of this study but I didn’t understand its importance of it in terms why a politician supports certain legislation. To me, this model vaguely outlined that sometimes polticians appear to be rational, and are at other times irrational. Reflecting on the most recent high-profile legislation it seems to me that almost all policy was targeted toward benefiting the negative, but powerful, groups: bailouts, healthcare in some ways. Would Ingram and Schneider suggest that despite its apparent irrationality, these policies are beneficial to both re-election and the promotion of the common goals that the article lays out? Will the almost inevitable loss of Democrat-filled seats on Congress act as an indication either way? What about government inaction on the policy front? Can a lack of policy influence norms or views of the political structure to either promote or hinder competence?
The Welfare and GI Bill studies provide very compelling evidence for how the design and perception of policy can influence norms and sensitivity to government. A few have commented on what we should do to reform welfare so I’ll save it for class. One thing I always look out for in these studies is self-selection bias. Could it be reasonable to entertain the idea that veterans of WWII were already pre-determined to take civil service jobs at a higher rate than other groups? Are people who are likely to go on welfare also be very unlikely to hold the government in high esteem? In any case, the main arguments that are expressed relate to the importance of the policy influences as an output, not input. As with any field in its infant stages, some kinks need to be addressed empirically.
Ingram’s discussion of social constructions/stereotypes and the sebsequent value we place on them presented a fresh look on the importance of this study but I didn’t understand its importance of it in terms why a politician supports certain legislation. To me, this model vaguely outlined that sometimes polticians appear to be rational, and are at other times irrational. Reflecting on the most recent high-profile legislation it seems to me that almost all policy was targeted toward benefiting the negative, but powerful, groups: bailouts, healthcare in some ways. Would Ingram and Schneider suggest that despite its apparent irrationality, these policies are beneficial to both re-election and the promotion of the common goals that the article lays out? Will the almost inevitable loss of Democrat-filled seats on Congress act as an indication either way? What about government inaction on the policy front? Can a lack of policy influence norms or views of the political structure to either promote or hinder competence?
The Welfare and GI Bill studies provide very compelling evidence for how the design and perception of policy can influence norms and sensitivity to government. A few have commented on what we should do to reform welfare so I’ll save it for class. One thing I always look out for in these studies is self-selection bias. Could it be reasonable to entertain the idea that veterans of WWII were already pre-determined to take civil service jobs at a higher rate than other groups? Are people who are likely to go on welfare also be very unlikely to hold the government in high esteem? In any case, the main arguments that are expressed relate to the importance of the policy influences as an output, not input. As with any field in its infant stages, some kinks need to be addressed empirically.
Welfare Recipients are Not Competent
In the article "Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action," Joe Soss argues that different groups, like the welfare citizens, interact differently with the government. This is due to the different experiences that the welfare client is exposed to and which in turn result in their political orientation and beliefs.
He compares two different assistant programs: The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). A participant in the AFDC is less likely to vote than a participant in the SSDI. Why is this the case? It is due to the client's experience in their agency. A client in the AFDC develops more fear in their agency because "they perceive their welfare relationships as one-way transactions in which the agency had the authority to issue directives". They remain silent because of vulnerability because speaking out or voicing their concerns can result in getting cut off from the AFDC. Therefore compliance seems logical and rational in order to keep their membership in the AFDC. This kind of relationship makes clients passive and unable to become active citizens because of their fear to authority. In the SSDI, clients seemed less fearful of speaking out and issuing their dealings with their agencies. They take more of an active role in defending their needs. Through their experience "they see evidence that they can be effective initiators".
Overall, welfare programs negatively affect participation in the government and also seem to create a bad interaction with the government. Welfare programs are the most direct institution that people can easily have access to which in turn seem to develop only negative views about the government. Even though welfare program's aim is to advance the American population in the process it only creates bad citizenship. This is a new perspective and never did I imagine that welfare programs could shape the way a person viewed the government or in this case the way that participation in politics could be negatively affected. Welfare programs do help many citizens but this achievement should not be at the cost of fear or to the decline of political participation.
Welfare- Bad for Citizenship?
In “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action,” Joe Soss highlights a very important perspective on the ways in which individuals and groups interact with the government. Furthermore, he analyzes how this interaction can temper one’s participation as an active citizen in politics. Soss argues that views of government that citizens develop through program participation- like welfare initiatives- help explain broader patterns of political action. Participants of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) have different experiences with the government through their respective welfare programs. It appears that there is a linkage between the amount of control and efficacy an individual feels they have in their particular welfare program and the way they view the greater government and the wider political process.
Prior to reading this piece, I had never really given much thought to the ways in which people establish their views of the government. Moreover, I had never seriously considered the varied spectrum of attitudes toward the government that the citizenry possesses and how individual attitudes affect individual and group participation in politics. Soss raises a very interesting- and perhaps alarming- point about welfare programs. Although welfare initiatives are intended to increase the prosperity and future of many Americans and their dependents, welfare may have an adverse effect on the development and involvement of what political scientists and experts define as good citizens. Yes, welfare may provide monetary advantages, but perhaps the procedures and bureaucratic processes that are necessary for the allocation of welfare need to be reevaluated if they can have such a profound impact on relative levels of participation from those citizens that take advantage of these programs. From Soss’ piece, it appears that many welfare recipients feel marginalized and objectified by the terms of their welfare agreements. I agree with Bri that a serious overhaul of the welfare system would be both costly and unpopular; however, I think the points raised by Soss should be given attention. Isn’t the intrinsic value of welfare diminished when the people who utilize its advantages don’t vote, aren’t informed, and/or unable or unwilling to try and alter the initiatives that affect them?
Throughout the semester, we have discussed possible reasons why American citizens are not as involved as political scientists would like them to be or think they ought to be. The possible reasons we have discussed vary widely, yet Soss’ piece introduces a new aspect on the cause of citizen apathy. Perhaps disdain for the government and a general apathy toward politics is being institutionalized in the very programs that the government supports and runs—like welfare. Are the interactions between welfare recipients and the government institutionalizing a disproportionate power relationship that significantly impacts an individual’s likelihood and willingness to be politically active as a good citizen (i.e. vote, volunteer to campaign, be informed, etc.)? If one of the government’s and/or political scientists’ objectives is to promote good citizenry –particularly from the lower socio-economic classes- we must minimize the principal-subordinate relationship (as suggested by Soss-AFDC) that has been introduced through certain welfare programs.
Prior to reading this piece, I had never really given much thought to the ways in which people establish their views of the government. Moreover, I had never seriously considered the varied spectrum of attitudes toward the government that the citizenry possesses and how individual attitudes affect individual and group participation in politics. Soss raises a very interesting- and perhaps alarming- point about welfare programs. Although welfare initiatives are intended to increase the prosperity and future of many Americans and their dependents, welfare may have an adverse effect on the development and involvement of what political scientists and experts define as good citizens. Yes, welfare may provide monetary advantages, but perhaps the procedures and bureaucratic processes that are necessary for the allocation of welfare need to be reevaluated if they can have such a profound impact on relative levels of participation from those citizens that take advantage of these programs. From Soss’ piece, it appears that many welfare recipients feel marginalized and objectified by the terms of their welfare agreements. I agree with Bri that a serious overhaul of the welfare system would be both costly and unpopular; however, I think the points raised by Soss should be given attention. Isn’t the intrinsic value of welfare diminished when the people who utilize its advantages don’t vote, aren’t informed, and/or unable or unwilling to try and alter the initiatives that affect them?
Throughout the semester, we have discussed possible reasons why American citizens are not as involved as political scientists would like them to be or think they ought to be. The possible reasons we have discussed vary widely, yet Soss’ piece introduces a new aspect on the cause of citizen apathy. Perhaps disdain for the government and a general apathy toward politics is being institutionalized in the very programs that the government supports and runs—like welfare. Are the interactions between welfare recipients and the government institutionalizing a disproportionate power relationship that significantly impacts an individual’s likelihood and willingness to be politically active as a good citizen (i.e. vote, volunteer to campaign, be informed, etc.)? If one of the government’s and/or political scientists’ objectives is to promote good citizenry –particularly from the lower socio-economic classes- we must minimize the principal-subordinate relationship (as suggested by Soss-AFDC) that has been introduced through certain welfare programs.
Americans with Disabilities Act
Yesterday, I heard a story on NPR's "This American Life" about the enforcement of the American's with Disabilities Act (ADA) in California. At least in California (I don't know about other states) there is no agency that monitors ADA laws that require buildings to be handicap accessible. The law is set up in such a way that individuals (normally handicap people) are given monetary incentives to sue businesses that do not comply with ADA laws. The rational behind this system can be explained by Schneider and Ingram's article about the social construct of target populations. According to Schneider and Ingram, the handicap fall under the category of dependents (positively constructed but with little political power). It is rational for those in power to not want to spend money on powerless dependent groups so they often use other tools besides direct resources when allocating benefits to these groups. In the example above, instead of allocating monetary resources to provide for building inspectors to make sure ADA laws are complied with, the system is set up whereby it is up to individuals to enforce the laws.
Creating a system in which handicap people must enforce ADA regulations has actually increased negative perceptions of this group by increasing discrimination. The handicap man who was interviewed in the NPR podcast said that he oftentimes has trouble booking accessible hotel rooms because hotel owners are afraid that their rooms won't be up to code and they will be sued. It is possible that this increased negative perception of a dependent group is beneficial for those in power because it means that they have to spend less money and time on benefits for the handicap. In the article Schneider and Ingram briefly mention that women are moving more toward a position of power and are being less positively viewed. I think it is plausible that the policy tools used for dependents not only makes some groups of dependents (women, handicap, and potentially others) less politically involved but might also push them towards being more negatively viewed. This might happen because policy tools for dependents oftentimes force them to seek out benefits which makes them seem pushy, greedy, and whiny by other groups.
School Safety: How much is too much?
Hirschfield's article on "School Surveillance in America" was very interesting to me on a personal level, as my experiences in both Middle and High School were extremely different from the ones portrayed in the reading for tomorrow's class. At the risk of sounding ignorant, I was not aware of the extent of the safety measures taken by some public schools to ensure the safety of their students after having spent the majority of my school days in private school. Though, from what I gathered in Hirschfield's article, it seems as though such measures are a necessary evil in public schools across America given the unpredictable nature of violence in these institutions. Following the events at Columbine High School, it seems reasonable that public schools would look to increase safety measures due to external pressure from parents, etc. Yet, at the same time, "the uneven use of surveillance practices for the purposes of punishment and exclusion can reinforce racial, gender, and socioeconomic disparities in arrests and suspensions, educational attainment, and school safety" (39). It is an interesting dynamic, as it seems very unlikely that the events that took place at Columbine High School in 1999 would happen again. However, the school systems have to react to such situations both swiftly and appropriately so as to ensure the safety of their students against future acts of violence despite how unlikely they may be. The use of cameras and metal detectors in public schools may put the minds of the students' parents at ease, but how much are they actually doing to mitigate violence in the public school system? Are we not conditioning these children to believe that they are, in fact, a threat to both themselves and society? Without developing a sense of trust among their peers and educators, they will probably be more likely to strike out against the system- which leads me to Hirschfield's discussion of "low-performing and disruptive students" (45).
All schools, private and public, have students that are either unmotivated or unwilling to participate in school and, as a result, become a distraction to the other students around them. The big difference is that private schools have the capacity to handle such students, while public schools do not. Private schools possess the necessary manpower to either turn these students' attitudes around, or to send them packing. Public schools, on the other hand, cannot devote the time to such students due to the size of the student body. Furthermore, they cannot expel students as easily as the private schools. Therefore, these disruptive children become not only a menace to themselves, but to the entire school. The schools can partake in an inclusive system of surveillance, or an exclusive system of surveillance depending on the institution itself. This is the heart of Hirschfield's issue: the degree to which public schools partake in surveillance practices given their political and social status. The use of metal detectors, for instance, implies that schools using such devices do not trust their student body based on a variety of factors related to race, socioeconomic status, gender, etc. The geographic location of these schools plays a large role in determining the extent of security as well. Schools situated in low-income areas will have a higher degree of surveillance based on the stereotypes of the location itself. Such students do not even have a chance at a normal upbringing because they are taught to believe that they should not be trusted. They will graduate (if they graduate) with a skewed perception of reality because they will have been treated like delinquents for the first 18 or so years of their lives. Yet, is it even possible to turn the system around? How can we, at this point in time, take metal detectors out of schools at the risk of the safety of a number of innocent students? It is obviously the case that there will always be some troublemakers, but the majority of students deserve to be given a chance. Before they are conditioned to believe they are "trouble," could they grow up to be successful members of society? It seems like we will never know, because we cannot risk another Columbine for the sake of a social experiment: "to thousands of bitter and anxious students forced to pass through them every day, metal detectors stand as a daily reminder of how little power students have over those in whom they entrust their futures and, in turn, how powerless their trusted guardians are to secure for the students a dignified, timely, and safe passage into school (and adulthood)" (51). It is a cruel system, one that does not show signs of easing up anytime soon given the nature of today's generation and their parents' anxiety. A handful of "bad" students ruined it for the "good" ones, because without the bad there would be no reason to subject the good to such degrading practices- if only we could distinguish the bad from the good without using stereotypes, etc.
California and Social Construction
I found the Schneider/Ingram article on Social Construction pertinent to many of the issues that surround us today. I was particularly interested in the negative or deviant groups. How could they shake off their unpopular stigma? By what method could these groups avoid punishment by the government, despite their powerless status? One group that is currently in the spotlight is California pot-smokers. Weed undoubtedly is viewed by the mass public as a horrible/immoral substance that should not be consumed. However, this conception may slowly be changing.
The article plays on the idea that the political advantages of punishing the powerless, deviant groups far outweigh any disadvantages. The public likes to see miscreants being reprimanded and when government officials do just that, their popularity increases. Given the current economic situation, some people propose marijuana legalization as a way to gain additional revenue via taxes and it can reduce the people affected by the criminal-justice system, which will reduce government costs in the form of imprisonment. While we will have to wait and see how Proposition 19 works out, it is evident that this negatively viewed group is gaining beneficial policy even though it is not a powerful group.
I do not know if this one example is universally applicable and I doubt that it is, but it does show one way that a deviant, powerless group can gain benefits. By drawing on economic appeals and depicting that it is in the government's best interest to legalize marijuana, California pot smokers may get policy in their favor. Even if Proposition 19 fails, it is not all bad news. California Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger already signed a bill that reduced possession of an ounce of weed from a misdemeanor to an infraction, equal to a parking ticket.
The negative perception may be dropped as Schneider said when, "prohibited behaviors spread to more powerful and more positively constructed groups." In this case some lawmakers may overlook any potential "immoral" aspect of marijuana and see the economic gain.
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