Government for the people, by some of the people

In contrasting "mobilization" with its modern counterpart "activation," Schier writes that the former provided a clear decision on their preferred party on the part of the citizenry, where the latter does not (9). While I do agree that the two terms have many differences, I disagree that this is one of them. Simply because one party was able to mobilize more voters does not mean that they participated more genuinely in politics than participants do today. As we have read, these party "mobilizers" would bribe citizens, hand out pre-checked ballots, etc., that made voting a largely irrational decision. These partisan elections did not see results that were more representative of Americans' true views more than those today.

Schier goes on to say that a decline in representative mobilization allows policy-makers to supplant consideration of majority views with the views of the targeted groups that elected them. I think, either way, the political power is in the hands of the politicians--whether these are the candidates themselves or the partisan "mobilizers"--because they choose how they want to mobilize the citizenry. In the partisan era, presumably voters weren't voting because they were taking into account the good of the country. Rather, they were provided with incentives or were incited by partisan ringleaders. This is essentially the same way it works today, but the groups are narrower, and the tangible incentives (15) have been replaced with behind-the-scenes ones. In both eras, it is doubtful that candidates feared the majority in their constituency, but rather, they feared the opposing candidate or party who would be able to rally that constituency. Even Claibourn and Martin point out that campaign advertising with a clear target risks identifying a "clear opponent" (9) as well, but that that opponent is usually appealed to by the opposing party/candidate itself--it is this possible appeal that proves threatening to politicians. The public at large, in its default passivity, was and still is not a looming threat without the appeal of external political forces.

Despite these minor flaws in his initial argument, Schier does well to describe the consequences of increased activation in modern politics, particularly in light of modern technology. His assertion that activation is here to stay (123) should worry those of us concerned with participatory democracy. If selective targeting allows only certain groups to feel they have "voice" (Claibourn and Martin, 10), and therefore a sense of political agency, government "by the people" adopts a too-narrow scope.