The more I learn, the fewer answers I have.

In the first of this week’s readings Michael Delli Carpini asserts that “democracy becomes more responsive and responsible the more informed, and the more equitably informed, is its citizenry”. The likelihood of having an equitable anything in American politics is as probable as finding a method for its implementation in Delli Carpini’s article. But this is not to say that I disagree entirely with the logic of Carpini’s argument. I accept his distinction between the “uninformed” and the “poorly informed”, and I claim that this is a relatively important distinction to make, one which I admittedly failed to acknowledge until recently. Carpini goes in to interesting detail of the varying depth of political knowledge across several of the Occidental states, showing that – compared to its peers – the US suffers from a lack of knowledge concerning foreign affairs. While I lack the information and the time to reinterpret the research findings, at least one possible explanation comes to mind. In looking at the date of the study-1994- it occurs to me that willful ignorance may be a factor in the failure to achieve better “scores” than our Western counterparts. Several important events had recently taken place which may have undermined the willingness of the American people to take interest in Bosnian affairs and the U.N. leadership of Boutros-Ghali. First, America’s excitement over driving the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in the early 90’s cannot be overstated. But, much like today’s Iraq War, the end did not necessarily mean The End. America’s army and air force were still heavily involved – and sometimes engaged – in controlling Hussein’s army with the use of coercive air superiority and a strategic denial campaign, namely Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch. Additionally, and more recently, our tactical and strategic failures to achieve any of our official and unofficial military and political objectives in the Horn of Africa culminated in the tragic Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. This event alone was enough to undermine the superiority complex of the US public – still celebrating its partial 1991 success in Southwest Asia – and divert its attentions away from international affairs. I would also contend that this, along with a general disinterest in African affairs, helps explain the fact that the general public could not name the Secretary-General of the UN in 1994, the worst year of the Rwanda Genocide. To be fair to the US, however, it seems that proximity plays a significant factor in the knowledge base of these countries; five of the eight states surveyed are in Europe, thereby providing them with considerably higher stakes in regards to Baltic conflicts. Unfortunately I cannot substantiate my ideas today with research, but considering how fluid our interests in international affairs can be these explanations may hold water. Barring research, however, I’m afraid my ideas are nothing more than a product of “poorly informed” opinions.

Despite some of my questions over the interpretation of the studies, I agree that a well-informed citizenry would make for better democracy. My concerns are not with the ends but with the means. As an example, we have made significant improvements at all levels of our education system over the past century. But other than emphasizing its importance, we cannot force the disinterested and the unwilling to participate successfully. This applies to politics as well, and the consequences are parallel. Our truancy laws may force class attendance, but they do not ensure willingness, motivation, or interest in participation or successful completion. Likewise, Americans may attempt to pressure their peers into political participation – recall the adage “if you don’t vote don’t complain” – but in the absence of true interest the results will be lacking in meaning and strength. By encouraging subpar participation, we invite even more self-interested participants who base their choices on emotional responses to “easy arguments”, a negative side effect of today’s political world in America according to Kuklinski and Quirk. Do we need more of that in American politics? Do we want that?

I found the Gaines, et al article particularly interesting, and it helps to reinforce a few of my own opinions. First, that citizens often interpret and support the facts that substantiate those beliefs that already correspond with their political views. And second, that citizens are loathe to change their beliefs in the face of alternative or changing facts. To find particularly strong support for the Gaines, et al argument we need look no further than our military. From personal experience I can say that a rather large plurality of those I served with have supported the Iraq War from its beginning. And in light of new facts that stood the Bush regime’s claim of WMD on its head, this plurality maintained their support, simply shifting the reason for the invasion from WMD to issues of humanity and the “necessary” removal of Hussein. Kuklinski and Quirk also criticize this “resistance to correction” in their article. Admittedly there are problems with this example, however. The largest proportion of our military are undoubtedly conservative, although this is arguably changing even as I write this. Furthermore, there is a strongly ingrained psychological motivation for troops to support military action that places them directly in the line of fire and often requires them to take the life of another human being. This involves a need to believe in what they’re doing, leaving the judgment of their actions for others. Another problem is that the military is not encouraged to consider possible alternatives. Instead, coercion prevents them from publicly criticizing their leaders and their choices; there are even military laws preventing these acts of “sedition”. Despite these distinctly service-oriented differences, however, this example supports the conclusions of Gaines, et al. I’m not certain that this changes my views of American democracy, however. I still believe in the power of the political pendulum. We have seen it first hand in the past few years with the shift from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. The danger of the pendulum is that it allows the American people to swing it too far to one side, thereby enabling it to “tip over”. And when it swings too far to the right – as it did with Bush – the electorate may force it too far to the left – as I argue it did with Obama. This is certainly dangerous for our political system, but it’s a danger we have created and one which we must live with. The only alternative is to place more trust in our political leadership to make decisions which may appear to abrogate our rights-based citizenry, but which may overall be better for America. I have no answer for how this would happen, and it certainly would invite its own dangers.