Confidently Incorrect

I was surprised by the relatively brief attention devoted in Kulinkski et al's piece to implications about the positive relationship between innaccuracy and confidence. The author's noted the concern, but I feel a great deal more discussion could be had about what this means for trying to remedy the problem, if that's something we are interested in doing. If people who are the most incorrect are also the most confident in their views, how are we suppposed to change their minds, especially if people are likely to revert back to previously held views when presented with accurate information, as suggested in the article.

This is an important question because not only are people who hold innaccurate views the most confident in their views, but they are most likely the type to be the most vocal in their innaccuracy. It could be a stretch in logic, but could the most innaccurate, who are often extremely confident in their views, and often the most vocal in their views, also be the most likely to express their views at the ballot?

I encourage you to check out this video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht8PmEjxUfg&feature=player_embedded), most notably from the 5:40-6:40 mark and 11:35-12:00 mark. It is a great example of a "hit between the eyes" moment. When the interviewer gives her a "hit between the eyes" piece of information around the 11:45 mark, the lady seems taken aback, but how likely will she be to revert back to her earlier views. Very likely according to Luskin, Fiskin, and Jowell (1997), whom Kulinski references in his piece.

I am very curious as to how we could possibly rememby a situation in which a portion of the electorate are recklessly incorrect and are often unphased by correct information.